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In the Supreme Court
of the State of Utah

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff and Respondent,

vs.

Case No. 7715

l\1cKINLEY SIMPSON,
Defendant and Appellant.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Appellant makes no statement of facts in his brief. Con·
sequently respondent deems it advisable to set forth the following statement of facts as shown in the record.
On January 28, 1951, during the nighttime, the defendant
McKinley Simpson accompanied by James Nixon, Robert
Clewis and Paul Perkins drove in Clewis' car to the Brewer
Tire Company located on 1st South and 1st West in Salt Lake
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City, Utah. Defendant and Perkins broke into and entered
the tire company by forcing open the back door and breaking
a small window in the back of the building. They took ten
( 10) tires, loaded them into the car and drove to Pete 1v1igliacco's Tavern, located at 363 \Vest South Temple, where defendant attempted to sell the tires to Mr. Migliacco (Tr. 45,
46, 52, 53, 54, 55, 76, 79, 80, 81, 105, 106, 11.0 and 111).
They also attempted to sell these tires to Henry Oliver the same
night (Tr. 69, 98).
Later the same night Paul Perkins and defendant returned
to the Brewer Tire Company where they again entered the
tire company to steal more tires (Tr. 56-84). This burglary
was interfered with by the arrival of Special Officers Haskell
Merrick and Jack Merrick (Tr. 56). The defendant and Perkins then ran out the back door, through an alley north, then
west to 1st West, north on 1st West to the north side of South
. Temple, leaving a clear trail of footprints in the snow (Tr.
57, 81, 84 and 87). Defendant and Perkins ran into an
alley parallel with South Temple proceeding east, turning
south and coming out on South Temple where they sought to
conceal themselves in the Utah Apartments (Tr. 57, 84, 85,
87, 88, 90, 107, 112, 115, 116, 117.)

.,

Police Officers Jack Ivferrick and Wilbur Anderson followed the two sets of fresh footprints in the snow from the
rear door of the Brewer Tire Company, north then west to 1st
West, north on Ist West to South Temple, north across South
Temple and into an alley running east parallel to South Temple,
then south to South Temple to the Utah Apartments where

4
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Otticer Jack Merrick arrested the defendant and Perkins (Tr.
82, 84, 85, 86, 87, 88, 89, 90 and 91).
The day following defendant's arrest, codefendant Nixon
sold four (-I) of these tires to Henry Oliver. The day following the sale to Henry Oliver, codefendant Nixon recovered
the tires he had sold to "stache" them in an attempt to prevent
detection because of the arrest of Perkins and the defendant
(Tr. 68, 69, 70, 71). These tires were recovered by Police
Officers D. F. Duncombe and \Vilbur Anderson with the aid
of Henry Oliver (Tr. 47, 58, 94, 70, and 95).
The defendant was convicted of second degree burglary
in the District Court of Salt Lake County, Utah, from which

conviction he appeals.

STATEMENT OF POINTS
I. THE COURT DID NOT COMl\HT ERROR BY RE-

CEIVING IN EVIDENCE STATEMENTS MADE BY A
CODEFENDANT OR ACCOMPLICE, OUT OF THE PRESENCE OF THE DEFENDANT THEN ON TRIAL.
II. THE DEFENDANT WAS NOT CONVICTED
SOLELY UPON THE UNCORROBORATED TESTIMONY
OF AN ACCOMPLICE; THEREFORE THE COURT COMMITTED NO ERROR IN DENYING DEFENDANT'S REQUEST FOR A DIRECTED VERDICT.
5
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III. THE COURT DID NOT COMMIT ERROR IN REFUSING TO INSTRUCT THE JURY TO VIE\V THE
TESTIMONY OF AN ACCOMPLICE WITH CAUTION.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE COURT DID NOT COMMIT ERROR BY RECEIVING IN EVIDENCE STATE1\1ENTS MADE BY A
CODEFENDANT OR ACCOl\fPLICE, OUT OF THE PRESENCE OF THE DEFENDANT THEJ\T ON TRIAL.
Appellant asserts that the trial court erred in admitting
the testimony of Henry Oliver as to conversations between himself and James Nixon, an accomplice and codefendant, which
took place the day after the alleged act of burglary (Tr. 69,
98). Appellant objected to this testimony on the grounds that
the conversation took place after the commission of the crime
charged and outside the presence of the defendant then on
trial.
Appellant's theory in the instant case is founded on the'
claim that the crime charged, burglary, was accomplished on
the night of January 28th and ended with the arrest of the
defendant the same night, and that therefore the testimony
of the statements made by the codefendant was not admissible
as against the defendant, Simpson.
Respondent submits that, although m accord with the
appellant's conception of the general rule that "under the
6
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rules of evidence, declarations of a joint defendant made after
the commission of the crime and in reference to it, in the
absence of the defendant on trial are not competent," that rule
is not applicable to the case at bar.
If it can be shown that a common purpose, conspiracy or
design of a criminal enterprise was in existence and pending,
and its fulfillment was not accomplished, such statements, acts
or declarations of a defendant may be used against a codefendant where such statements were made in the furtherance of the
common purpose, conspiracy or design of the criminal undertaking. The trial record clearly reveals that such a conspiracy
existed, viz. to burglarize the Brewer Tire Company and to
wrongfully gain from the sale of these tires.
There is sufficient proof in the record that the conspiracy
existing between the codefendants was a continuing one and
that the act of burglary was only a part of the general plan of
the conspiracy in its entirety. Therefore, the testimony of the
conversations of codefendant Nixon, while given after the
perpetration of the primary object of the conspiracy, viz. the
burglary of the Brewer Tire Company, was made in the furtherance of the over all conspiracy and common design rather
than after the completion of the crime as alleged by the appellant.
The evidence of record reveals that a conspiracy did in fact
.:xist between the four codefendants, and does so without reference to any testimony of an accomplice or codefendant herein
concerned.
First there is the act of burglary itself.

C. W. Brewer

7
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testified to the manner in which entrance to the tire company
was gained by defendant and Perkins. He testified also to the
number and kind of tires stolen and identified them at the
trial as exhibits A and B (Tr. 44-50). Further evidence of the
breaking and entering was furnished by the testimony of
Special Officer Haskell J\!Ierrick (Tr. 79, 80, 81).
Defendant and codefendants, Clewis, Nixon, Perkins,
were all identified and connected with this common plan,
scheme, or conspiracy by the testimony of Henry Oliver, Pete
Migliacco, and Officers Merrick and Anderson. Henry Oliver
testified that Nixon, Clewis and the defendant were together
in the car when an attempt was made by them to sell the tires
to him (Tr. 69, 98). Pete Migliacco connected defendant
with this crime by his testimony as to the two separate occasions
when the defendant attempted to sell him the tires. The first
time the defendant attempted the sale alone and the second
time Mr. Migliacco testified that the defendant was not alone
(Tr. 74 and 75) ~ Officers Jack Merrick and Anderson con·
nected defendant and Perkins with this conspiracy. Both officers testified as to tracing the two sets of footprints in the
snow from the rear door of the Brewer Tire Company directly
to where these officers arrested the defendant and Perkins (Tr.
84, 85, 87, 88, 90, 91).
Pete Migliacco' s testimony that defendant approached him
on two different occasions during the night of the alleged crime,
once before the established time of the actual act of burglary
and once after the established time of the actual act of burglary,
strongly if not conclusively points out that a common plan,
scheme, or conspiracy existed at that time between the code8
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fendants to burglarize the time company and to sell the stolen
tires for wrongful gain (Tr. 67, 98). Mr. Brewer also testified
that the Brewer Tire Company is the exclusive dealer of the
particular type of tires identified as Exhibits A and B; that
such white wall tires were scarce at the time, that a shipment
of such tires had been received about 36 hours prior to the
burglary and that none of this type of tire had been distributed
by the company out of that shipment. A1so Mr. Brewer identified the tires presented in court as the type and kind stolen
from his establishment. Police Officers Duncombe and Anderson identified these tires and testified as to their recovery, with
the assistance of Henry Oliver (Tr. 47, 48, 70, 94 and 95).
Respondent submits that the above testimony conclusively
establishes the existence of a continuing design: plan or conspiracy between the four codefendants to burglarize the tire
company and to sell the tires for wrongful gain.
The testimony of Henry Oliver, to which objections were
made by counsel for appellant and the admission of which
appellant alleges was in error is set out on pages 66 to 71 of
the transcript. Oliver testified that Nixon awakened him on
the night of the alleged crime and stated that the defendant
wanted to see him in the car; there, with Clewis and Nixon,
defendant attempted to sell him tires. The following day
Nixon sold four ( 4) tires to him. The day following the sale
Nixon recovered the tires from him to "stache" or conceal
them to prevent detection because the defendant and Perkins
had been arrested.
In the case of State v. Hill, 352 Mo .. 895, 179 SW 2d 712,

9
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where the defendant had been convicted of the crime of embezzlement the court held:

" * * * the state (may) introduce evidence of statements made by a participant in crime against another
if the statements were made in furtherance of a conspiracy. The fact that the alleged statements were made
after the crime had been perpetrated does not necessarily render the statements inadmissible. * * * In
State v. Priesmeyer, 327 Mo. 335, 37 SW 2d 425, loc.
cit. 427, this court commented as follows:
"If a conspiracy continues for any purpose such as
disposing of the loot, the effecting of an escape, the
concealing of the crime, the admissions of one conspirator would be admissible against another."
The fact that a conspirator was under arrest at the
time the statements were made is not always conclusive
against the admissibility of the statements in evidence.
However, statements of one conspirator cannot be used
as evidence against another unless they were made in
furtherance of the conspiracy. See 22 CJS Criminal Law,
Sections 768, 772, 774, 777, Pages 1309-1320 incl.
In People v. Lorraine, 90 Cal. App. ~.I 7, 265 P 893, where
the defendant was convicted of the crime of grand larceny,
the court held:

" * * * The rule relating to the admissibility of the
acts and declarations of coconspirators is well settled,
and is to the effect that, where an unlawful enterprise
. between two or more persons, either by direct or circumstantial evidence, every act or declaration of each
member of the confederacy in pursuance of the original
concerted plan and with reference to the common object is, in contemplation of law, the act and declaration
of them all, and is therefore original evidence against
10
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each of thein, and that every one who thus enters into
a common purpose or design is generally deemed in
law a party to every act which had before been done
by the others and a party to every act which may afterwards be done by any of the others in furtherance of
such common design. * * *
The common design of a criminal enterprise may extend, however, as appellant concedes, beyond the point
of the commission of the act constituting the crime
for which the alleged conspirator is on trial. (People
v. Opie, 12 3 Cal. 294, 55 P. 989; People v. Mazurco,
49 Cal. App. 275, 193 P. 164; People v. Holmes, 118
Cal. 444, 50 P. 675; People Y. Rodley, 131 Cal. 240,
63 P. 351) ; and, as declared in California Jurisprudence, vol. 5, p. 523. * * *
In other words, whether or not the subsequent act
committed is the ordinary and probable effect of the
common design or whether it is a "fresh and independ- ·
ent product of the mind of one of the conspirators,
outside of, or foreign to, the common design, is a
question of fact for the jury * * *, and if there be any
evidence to support the finding of the jury on this
question, its determination is conclusive."
In the case of People v. Suter, 43 Cal. App. 2d 444, 111 Pac.
2d 23, the court held:

" * * * It has been held that the common design of
a criminal enterprise may extend in point of time beyond the actual commission of the act constituting
the crime for which the accused is being tried, such as
for the purpose of concealing the crime, securing the
proceeds thereof, sharing or dividing the prgceeds of
the crime or bribing or influencing witnesses, and consequently evidence is admissible to prove acts committed after the perpetration of the crime for which
11

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

the accused is on trial. Of course, it must reasonably
appear that such acts were committed. in the furtherance of the common design of the conspiracy. It must
also be remembered that the question when the design
is accomplished, abandoned or frustrated~ and whether
the acts proved are a part of the design of the conspiracy
are for the jury to determine from the facts and circumstances of each case and the nature and purpose of the
conspira_cy. See Thompson tJ. State, 58 Ga. App. 593,
199 SE 568; and People t'. Ross, 46 Cal. App. 2 385,
116 p 2d 81.
In State v. Erwin, 101 Utah 305, 120 Pac. 2d 285, the
court held:
The acts done by the conspirators in order to escape
the consequences thereof, even though they at the time
know that the conspiracy cannot continue, are nevertheless acts done in the furtherance of the conspiracy.
The fact that this act was done after the time limit
placed in the indictment does not make it inadmissible
as long as it was in furtherance of the conspiracy. See
also State v. Scott, 111 Utah 9, 175 Pac. 2d 1016, and
State v. Inlow, 44 Utah 450, 141 Pac. 530.
Respondent submits that the actions and conversations of
Nixon on January 29th, as testified to by Oliver, a common
design, plan or conspiracy having been proven by other testimony, reveals· clearly that his actions were in furtherance of
the overall general plan of the existing conspiracy. Under the
above authorities, the testimony given by Oliver about Nixon
recovering the tires from him after the sale to "stache" or conceal them from the police to prevent detection, after defendant
and Perkins were arrested, was admissible as against defendant
then on trial (Tr. 70, 71).
A review of the record in this case indicates that the ob12
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ject of the unlawful scheme, enterprise or conspiracy was not
only to secure the tires from the Brewer Tire Company but
also to thereby gain from the sale of these illegally obtained
tires. There being ample proof of the existence of a continuing
plan or conspiracy, the evidence of acts and declarations occurring after the accomplishment of the primary object, viz,
the burglary of the Brewer Tire Company, is here admissible
as being in furtherance of the general plan or conspiracy in
its entirety. It was not prejudicial error to admit that evidence.

II
THE DEFENDANT WAS NOT CONVICTED SOLELY
UPON THE UNCORROBORATED TESTIMONY OF AN
ACCOMPLICE; THEREFORE THE COURT COMMITTED
NO ERROR IN DENYING DEFENDANT'S REQUEST FOR
A DIRECTED VERDICT.
Section 105-32-18, Utah Code Annotated 1943, is cited

by appellant as constituting the main basis for appeal and reads
as follows:
A conviction shall not be had on the testimony of
an accomplice, unless he is corroborated by other evidence, which in itself and without the aid of the testimony of the accomplice tends to connect the defendant
with the commission of the offense and the corroboration shall not be sufficient, if it merely shows the commission of the offense or the circumstances thereof.
It is respondent's contention that the evidence at the trial
sufficiently corroborates the testimony of the accomplice. In
the case of State t'. Erwin, supra., this court held:

13
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This Court has held this corroboration need not go
to all the material facts testified to by the accomplice
(State v. Stewart, 57 Ut. 224, 193 P 855); that the
corroborative evidence need not be sufficient in itself
to support a conviction; it may be slight and entitled
to little consideration. People v. Lee, 2 Utah 441; State
v. Spender, 15 Utah 149, 49 P ~·02. * * *
On the other hand, the corroborating evidence must
implicate the defendant in the offense and be consistent
with his guilt and inconsistent with his innocence, and
must do more than cast a grave suspicion on him, and
all of this must be without the aid of the testimony
of the accomplice. State v. Lay, 38 Utah 143, 110 P
986; State v. Butterfield, 70 Utah 529, 261 P 804; State
v. Park, 44 Utah 360, 140 P 768; State v. Kimball, 45
Utah 443, 146 P 313; State v. Powell, 45 Utah 19 193,
143 P 588; State v. Bridwell, 48 Utah 97, 158 P 710;
State v. Baum, 47 Utah 7, 151 P. 518; State v. Frisby,
49 Utah 227, 162 P 616; State v. Elmer, 49 Utah 6,
161 P 167; State v. Gardner, 83 Utah 145, 27 P 2d 51.
The corroborative evidence of an accomplice, unlike
proof of corpus delicti, may consist in the admissions
of the accused. * * *
See Wharton on Criminal Evidence, 11th Edition, Volume
2, Section 752, 753, 748, 746 and 754, pages 1257 to 1273
inclusive.
See also 25 ALR 886; 87 ALR 767; State v. TVade, 66 Utah
276, 241 Pac. 808; State v. Laris, 78 TJtah 183, 2 P 2d 242;
State v. Carafes, 74 Utah 94, 277 Pac. 203; State v. Cox, 74
Utah 149, 277 Pac. 972; People v. Derenzo, 46 Cal. App. 2d
114, 115 P 2d 858; and People v. Negra . 208 Cal. 64, 280
Pac. 354.

14
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The record, entirely aside from the testimony of the accomplice, amply connects defendant with the crime and corroborates that testimony. The record establishes that twice during the night of January 28th the defendant went to Pete's
Tavern, once alone and once with the codefendants, to obtain
a buyer for the stolen tires (Tr. 74, 75, 105, 106 and 110).
Both times the defendant displayed knowledge of where the
tires were to come from and the same tires were later identified
as those stolen from the Brewer Tire Company (Tr. 47, 48, 49,
93 and 94). The possession of the stolen tires and defendant's
assertion of ownership certainly are sufficient to establish the
defendant's participation and connection with this offense. In
Yeargin v. State, 54 Okla. Cr. 34, 14 P 2d 431, the court held:
Where an accused person is found in possession of
property taken from a place recently burglarized, that
fact may be considered by the jury, along with all
other circumstances, as tending to show that the one
in possession committed the burglary.
See also Robinson z·. State, 67 Okla. Cr. Rep. 8, P 2d 1082,
and State v. Butterfield, 70 Utah 529, 261 Pac. 804; and State
z:. Morris, 70 Utah 53~·, 262 Pac. 107.
Police Officers Merrick and Anderson were able to follow
two clear sets of footprints in the snow from the rear door of
the Brewer Tire Company directly to where Defendant and
Paul Perkins were arrested (Tr. 82, 84, 85, 86, 87, 88, 89, 90,
91).
Defendant in his own testimony admitted running from the
officers to avoid arrest. Defendant also admitted going into
15
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the Utah Apartments on South Temple to avoid arrest, where
he attempted to conceal himself (Tr. 107, 114, 11.5, 116, 117).
The record also shows that during the course of defendant's flight and attempted concealment he was observed with
Paul Perkins by Officer Anderson who was following the footprints (Tr. 87 and 88).
Flight and concealment of defendant immediately after
a crime has been committed is corroborative evidence of guilt.
See 2 5 ALR 886, and Wha~ton on Criminal Evidence, Section
748.
Defendant was not convicted upon the uncorroborated
testimony of an accomplice. His own testimony and the testimony of· the police officers and others amply conect him with
the crime and fully corroborate Perkins' testimony.

POINT III
THE COURT DID NOT COMMIT ERROR IN REFUSING TO INSTRUCT THE JURY TO VIEW THE TESTIMONY OF AN ACCOMPLICE WITH CAUTION.
Appellant contends that the court committed error in refusing his request for a cautionary instruction in regards to the
testimony of an accomplice. Respondent submits that while
such an instruction would have been proper, the trial court
did not err in refusing such request especially where the subject had been amply covered by other instnlCtions.
16
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General! y as to instructions of this type see Blashfield, on
Instructions to Juries, Section 219, Page 487, which states:
\X.'hile the cases are all agreed that it is a better
practice to give the jury a caution of this nature, it is
nevertheless held by the majority of decisions that it
is merely "a rule of practice, and not a rule of law,"
and therefore a failure of the judge to give such an
instruction of his own motion, or even a refusal to do
so· on request, is not erroneous, or, if erroneous, is not
a ground for reversal.
Jones, on Evidence, 2d Edition, Volume 5, Section 2217,
page 4233, states:
Although it might ordinarily be regarded as an
omission of duty for the judge to neglect so to instruct
the jury, the decisions are to the effect that his refusal
so to do is not reversable error, as the matter lies in
the discretion of the judge. * * *
There are numerous authorities and cases which point
out that the court does not err in refusing such an instruction
where the testimony of the accomplice is corroborated by other
evidence in the case.
The court in the case at bar gave the jury sixteen ( 16)
written instructions for their consideration and guidance. Respondent contends that the jury was sufficiently informed by
these instructions and in effect was cautioned as to the testimony of the accomplice by the instructions of the court Nos.
10, 11, 12, and in particular Instruction No. 9, which reads as
follows:
17
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In judging the weight of the testimony and credibility of any witness, you should keep in mind the bias,
if any is shown, of such witness, his interest, if any,
in the result of the trial, and any probable motive or
lack thereof to testify as he does. You may consider his
appearance on the witness stand, the reasonableness
or lack thereof of his statements, his apparent frankness and candor, or the want of it, his opportunity to
know, his ability to understand, his capacity to remember, together with all of the facts and circumstances
which have a bearing on the accuracy of his statements.
You should also consider any contradictory evidence,
and whether or not he contradicted himself, and evidence, if any, pertaining to his character as to truthfulness and honesty, or the lack thereof, and from all the
facts and circumstances given in evidence determine
what weight and credibility you should give to the
testimony of any witness.
Other cases supporting respondent's contention are: State
v. Gross ( 1948), 31 \X'ash. 2d 202, 196 P 2d 297; and State
v. Bixby ( 1947), 27 Wash. 2d 144, 177 P 2d 689; State v.
Troiani (1924), 129 Wash. 228,224 Pac. 389; State v. Simp.ron,
119 Wash. 653, 206 Pac. 561; and People v. Rankin (1944), 64
Cal. App. 2d 956, 153 P 2d 399.
Respondent contends that the evidence sufficiently corroborated the testimony of accomplice Perkins and no error
was committed by the court in refusing to give the cautionary
instruction requested.

CONCLUSION
In conclusion, it is submitted that the evidence in this case
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fully supports the verdict and that the lower court committed
no error in refusing to direct the jury to acquit the defendant.
The verdict should be sustained.
Respectfully submitted.
CLINTON D. VERNON,
Attorney General
FRANCIS C. LUND,
Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for Plaintiff and Respondents
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